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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal we must decide whether plaintiff-appellant 
Derrick D. Fontroy can recover damages under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 for emotional distress allegedly caused by his 
exposure to asbestos, even though he presently manifests 
no physical injury. The district court determined that, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1988, Pennsylvania law controls 
the issue and Fontroy has no claim as a matter of law. We 
agree with the district court and will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
This case began in 1986 when Fontroy filed a pro se 
claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 against David Owens, the 
Superintendent of the Philadelphia Prison System. At the 
time, Fontroy was an inmate in the protective custody unit 
known as "D Rear" at Holmesburg Prison in Philadelphia. 
He alleged a variety of unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement in his complaint, including his allegations 
concerning asbestos. 
 
After the district court appointed counsel in November of 
1988, Fontroy filed a second amended complaint 1 in which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court dismissed several of the claims Fontroy asserted in 
his original complaint in April of 1987 but permitted his action to 
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he named three additional prison officials as defendants. 
He stated his asbestos-related allegations as follows: 
 
        14. During the entire period of time which Pla intiff 
       spent in D Rear, he was surrounded by the known 
       carcinogenic, asbestos, which was loosely wrapped 
       around pipes and visibly present in the walls and 
       ceilings of both the D Rear cells and common area, and 
       to which Plaintiff was constantly exposed. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        16. As a direct result of Plaintiff 's cons tant, 
       unreasonable[,] and unnecessary exposure to asbestos 
       in his place of confinement, Plaintiff was caused to 
       suffer various injuries to his mind and body, all of 
       which injuries will probably be permanent in nature 
       and have in the past, and will in the future cause 
       Plaintiff to suffer great pain and suffering, physical 
       pain, mental anguish, extreme fright, embarrassment 
       and humiliation, anxiety, depression and loss of life's 
       pleasures. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        24. At all times material, there existed a reg ular, 
       frequent, and continuous pattern of incidents which 
       exposed Plaintiff to a pervasive risk of harm . . . from 
       exposure to asbestos in deprivation of his civil rights 
       . . . . 
 
App. at 34-37. 
 
In December of 1991, the defendants moved for summary 
judgment. In his Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment, Fontroy responded, in part, 
"Assuming that [the cases cited by the defendants] hold 
that a civil rights plaintiff cannot prevail on a claim of mere 
exposure to asbestos, this case is distinguishable. Plaintiff 
here claims an injury; a claim which Defendants have not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
proceed, inter alia, on the asbestos-related claim. Defendant Owens 
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss in June of 1987, after which 
Fontroy filed his first amended complaint. The district court again 
dismissed some of Fontroy's remaining claims but allowed his asbestos- 
related claim to proceed. 
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disproved." App. at 845. Fontroy then attempted to 
distinguish cases cited by the defendants in a footnote 
where he stated: 
 
       Defendants maintain these decisions collectively hold 
       that an inmate's exposure to asbestos does not 
       constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment 
       guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. 
       Contraty [sic] to Defendants' broad interpretation, 
       Plaintiff asserts the cases stand for the narrow 
       proposition that prisoner lawsuits based on the 8th 
       Amendment will not be permitted when there is mere 
       exposure to asbestos. Thus, there can be no judicial 
       remedy for the enhanced risk of future harm from mere 
       exposure, but a litigant could recover if the exposure 
       results in the manifestation of physical injury. 
 
Id. 
 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants in May of 1991 because, inter alia, an X-ray 
showed Fontroy had not suffered any physical injury from 
his alleged exposure to asbestos. The district court 
determined that "[w]ithout evidence of injury related to 
exposure to asbestos, there is no genuine issue of material 
fact pertaining to plaintiff's asbestos claims." App. at 59 
(citations omitted). 
 
We affirmed the district court's order by a judgment order 
on February 25, 1993. See Fontroy v. Owens, 989 F.2d 486 
(3d Cir. 1993). Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 113 S. Ct. 
2475 (1993), which held that a prisoner "states a cause of 
action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that 
[prison officials] have, with deliberate indifference, exposed 
him to levels of [environmental tobacco smoke] that pose an 
unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health." 
Id. at 35, 113 S. Ct. at 2481. 
 
In August of 1993, Fontroy filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari. See 62 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 23, 1993) (No. 
93-281). One of the questions presented to the Supreme 
Court was whether our decision, described by Fontroy as 
holding "that [an] inmate's involuntary exposure to asbestos 
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does not raise an Eighth Amendment claim absent present 
injury," was contrary to Helling. 62 U.S.L.W. 3201 (1993). 
 
On January 10, 1994, the Supreme Court granted a writ 
of certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded "for 
further consideration in light of Helling v. McKinney." 510 
U.S. 1033, 114 S. Ct. 671, 671-72 (1994). In accord with 
the Court's mandate, we remanded to the district court, 
offering the following guidance: 
 
       Thus we will remand to the district court to determine 
       whether summary judgment would still be appropriate, 
       either because Fontroy waived the legal theory on 
       which his remaining claim rests, the record is barren of 
       any evidence of the presence of asbestos, or otherwise. 
       If not, the district court should proceed with the case 
       on the merits. In that connection we note from the 
       record that Fontroy was transferred from the prison in 
       question while this case was still pending in the 
       district court. The Helling opinion notes that the 
       petitioner sought both injunctive relief, i.e. a non- 
       smoking cellmate, and damages, but it appears the 
       primary focus was on the injunction. Thus the 
       Supreme Court did not have occasion to comment on 
       the request for damages by a plaintiff who alleged only 
       risk of future injury. That issue may arise in this case, 
       and if so we leave it for the district court's 
       consideration in the first instance. 
 
Fontroy v. Owens, 23 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
On remand, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants in October of 1996. The 
court determined that (1) there was no genuine issue of 
material fact concerning Fontroy's lack of physical injury 
and (2) Fontroy had no cause of action for damages under 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 for emotional distress allegedly caused by 
exposure to asbestos in the absence of present physical 
injury. Fontroy subsequently filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which the district court denied. He appeals 
only the district court's determination that in the absence 
of physical injury from his exposure he has no cause of 
action at this time. 
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II. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331 and 1343. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise plenary review of the district 
court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
See Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Summary judgment is appropriate "only if there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the relevant law entitles 
the moving party to judgment." Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 
176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993).2 
 
III. 
 
We must determine whether 42 U.S.C. S 1983 affords 
Fontroy a cause of action for damages for emotional 
distress allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos without 
proof of physical injury.3 The text of section 1983 itself does 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the parties submitted argument at our invitation concerning 
the retroactivity of section 803(d)(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, 
42 U.S.C. S 1997e(e), the parties did not raise the issue before the 
district court. Section 803(d)(e) provides that prisoners may not bring a 
federal civil action for mental or emotional injury absent a prior 
demonstration of physical injury. See id. It became effective on April 26, 
1996, approximately five months before the district court entered an 
order disposing of all claims on October 3, 1996. The parties' failure to 
raise the issue before the district court prevents our review of the 
issue. 
Cf. Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1997) (inmates who 
failed to respond to the district court's request for argument concerning 
the retroactive application of section 803(d)(e) waived appellate review 
of 
the issue). 
 
3. As a preliminary matter, the defendants contend that Fontroy waived 
his claim for damages for emotional distress in the absence of physical 
injury. Specifically, they argue that Fontroy's statements, quoted above, 
in his Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Summary Judgment 
conceded that such damages are not available. The district court did not 
agree. Prior to its grant of summary judgment in October of 1996, the 
district court determined that Fontroy had not waived his claim and 
entered an appropriate order in November of 1994. The district court 
stated therein, "Plaintiff did not waive any such claim in his answer to 
defendant's motion for summary judgment -- plaintiff stated only that 
assuming the cases cited by defendant would preclude a claim for mere 
exposure to asbestos, his claim was distinguishable because he did 
suffer a present injury." App. at 76. We have reviewed Fontroy's 
statements and agree with the district court that Fontroy did not waive 
this claim. 
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not resolve the issue, nor does it prescribe the applicable 
rules of decision.4 Consequently, we must discern the 
applicable rules of decision by applying the analysis 
mandated by Congress in 42 U.S.C. S 1988,5 which the 
Supreme Court has described as follows. 
 
       First, courts are to look to the laws of the United 
       States "so far as such laws are suitable to carry [the 
       civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect." If no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 1983 states: 
 
        Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
       regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District 
       of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the 
       United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the 
       deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
       Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
       action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress, 
       except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an 
act 
       or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive 
relief 
       shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
       declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this 
section, 
       any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of 
       Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
       Columbia. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1983. 
 
5. The relevant portion of section 1988 provides: 
 
        The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the 
       district courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the 
       Revised Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United 
       States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be 
       exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United 
       States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into 
effect; 
       but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are 
       deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies 
       and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and 
       changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the 
       court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, 
so 
       far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws 
       of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said 
courts 
       in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a 
criminal 
       nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1988(a). 
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       suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the 
       second step by considering application of state 
       "common law, as modified and changed by the 
       constitution and statutes" of the forum State. A third 
       step asserts the predominance of the federal interest: 
       courts are to apply state law only if it is not 
       "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the 
       United States." 
 
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 
2928 (1984) (quoting 42 U.S.C. S 1988(a)). 
 
The district court made three determinations in applying 
this analysis: (1) the Supreme Court's decision in Helling v. 
McKinney, 510 U.S. 1033, 114 S. Ct. 671, 672 (1994), did 
not create a federal rule that an inmate may sustain a 
section 1983 action for damages for emotional distress in 
the absence of physical injury; (2) the law of Pennsylvania, 
which does not allow an inmate to assert such a claim, 
controls pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1988; and (3) 
Pennsylvania's law is not "inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States," 42 U.S.C. 
S 1988. 
 
There is no dispute that Pennsylvania is the appropriate 
forum state for section 1988 purposes or that Pennsylvania 
law does not provide a cause of action for damages for 
emotional distress for exposure to asbestos without proof of 
physical injury. See Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 
238 (Pa. 1996). We will review the remaining 
determinations in seriatim. 
 
A. 
 
Fontroy contends that Helling provides a federal rule that 
would allow his claim for monetary relief. In Helling, the 
Supreme Court held that an inmate may recover injunctive 
relief in a section 1983 action based on exposure to 
environmental, i.e., second-hand, cigarette smoke in the 
absence of present physical injury. See 509 U.S. at 33-35, 
113 S. Ct. at 2480-81. The Court reasoned that "[i]t would 
be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved 
an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the 
ground that nothing yet had happened to them." Id. at 33, 
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113 S. Ct. at 2481. The Court did not address the 
availability of damages in such cases--a point which we 
specifically recognized in remanding Fontroy's case to the 
district court following the Supreme Court's grant of his 
petition for certiorari. See Fontroy v. Owens, 23 F.3d at 66 
("Thus the Supreme Court did not have occasion to 
comment on the request for damages by a plaintiff who 
alleged only risk of future injury."). More importantly, the 
Helling Court's reasoning concerning injunctive relief does 
not translate to a claim for monetary relief.6 The Court's 
statement that it would be odd to deny an inmate an 
injunction against future harm until that harm actually 
occurred sheds no light on the availability of monetary 
damages to redress past wrong. We therefore conclude that 
Helling does not create a federal rule that would provide 
Fontroy a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. 
 
B. 
 
Fontroy also contends that the district court erred in 
applying Pennsylvania law because, in contravention of 
section 1988, it is purportedly inconsistent with federal 
law. As support, Fontroy cites cases involving the alleged 
use of excessive force, see, e.g., Hudson v. McMillan, 503 
U.S. 1, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (an inmate may recover 
damages for excessive use of force even if the inmate does 
not suffer serious injuries), and cases involving prison 
officials' alleged failures to protect inmates from other 
inmates, see, e.g., Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742 (3d Cir. 
1997) (an inmate who had a long history of being assaulted 
could sustain a section 1983 action alleging that prison 
officials ignored an excessive risk to his safety). 
 
In contrast to Fontroy, however, the inmates in both of 
these cases actually suffered some degree of physical 
injury. Cf. Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 270 (7th Cir. 
1996) (an inmate "who was not assaulted by, and who is no 
longer at risk from, fellow inmates" had no cause of action 
for damages "based solely on prison officials' past failure to 
take measures to protect the prisoner from inmates known 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. An injunction would be useless to Fontroy because he is no longer 
incarcerated at Holmesburg Prison. 
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to pose a danger"). Fontroy's case, moreover, is a so-called 
conditions of confinement case. The Hudson Court 
differentiated excessive force cases from cases alleging 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement based upon the 
degree of deprivation required to state a colorable claim. In 
a conditions of confinement case, "extreme deprivations are 
required to make out a . . . claim[,]" whereas "[i]n the 
excessive force context, society's expectations are different" 
because "[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically 
use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of 
decency always are violated." 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S. Ct. at 
1000. 
 
Fontroy also argues that Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 
98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978), provides a federal rule that plaintiffs 
may recover damages for emotional distress in a section 
1983 action absent physical injury. The Carey Court held 
that emotional distress caused by the deprivation of due 
process is compensable under section 1983 without proof 
of physical injury. See id. at 264, 98 S. Ct. at 1052. In 
reaching this holding, the Court cautioned that"[i]n order 
to further the purpose of S 1983, the rules governing 
compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of 
constitutional rights should be tailored to the interests 
protected by the particular right in question[.]" Id. at 259, 
98 S. Ct. at 1050. Moreover, the Court stated that "the 
elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages 
appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the 
deprivation of one constitutional right are not necessarily 
appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the 
deprivation of another." Id. at 264-65, 98 S. Ct. at 1052. 
 
Fontroy's argument would require us to ignore these 
precepts by applying Carey, a deprivation of due process 
case, to a case alleging a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. The Carey court determined that the "denial of 
procedural due process should be actionable for nominal 
damages without proof of actual injury" because "the right 
to procedural due process is `absolute' in the sense that it 
does not depend upon the merits of a claimant's 
substantive assertions[.]" Id. at 266, 98 S. Ct. at 1054. In 
contrast, the Hudson court instructed that"extreme 
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deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of- 
confinement claim[,]" such as Fontroy's. 503 U.S. at 9, 112 
S. Ct. at 1000.7 
 
Based on the foregoing, we decline to reverse the district 
court on the basis that Pennsylvania law is "inconsistent 
with the Constitution and laws of the United States[.]" 42 
U.S.C. S 1988(a). Federal law does not provide inmates, who 
suffer no present physical injury, a cause of action for 
damages for emotional distress allegedly caused by 
exposure to asbestos. Cf. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. 
Buckley, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2113 (1997) (a federal 
employee may not recover damages under the Federal 
Employer's Liability Act for emotional distress caused by 
exposure to asbestos absent manifestations of injury). 
 
IV. 
 
In conclusion, we hold that the district court did not err 
by applying Pennsylvania law to Fontroy's section 1983 
claim and, consequently, that Fontroy has no cause of 
action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for damages for emotion 
distress allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos without 
proof of physical injury.8 We will affirm the October 31, 
1996, order of the district court granting summary 
judgment against plaintiff-appellant Fontroy. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Fontroy's citation of our decision in Bolden v. Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 21 F.3d 29 (3d Cir. 1994) (section 1983 
action for emotional distress damages arising out of an allegedly 
unconstitutional drug test of employee), is also unavailing for the same 
reasons. 
 
8. Since our holding fully disposes of Fontroy's appeal, we need not 
address the defendants' argument that Fontroy's claim "effectively 
constitutes a municipal liability claim against the City of 
Philadelphia[,]" 
Appellees' Br. at 36, and that Fontroy failed to demonstrate a municipal 
policy or practice of deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates, 
which is a requisite element for municipal liability in a section 1983 
action. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Services of the City of New York, 
436 U.S. 658, 690-94, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035-38 (1978). 
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